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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 




PATRICK ADAM THOMETZ, 
 












          NO. 44210 
 
          Minidoka County Case No.  
          CR-2014-4031 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Thometz failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his amended Rule 35 motion for reduction of his unified sentence of five years, 
with two years fixed, imposed following his guilty plea to grand theft? 
 
 
Thometz Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 On November 16, 2014, while he was on probation for a 2010 felony eluding 
conviction and a 2013 felony DUI conviction, Thometz went to the customer service 
desk at Wal-Mart and “returned” several boxed items, including “a keyboard tablet case 
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and an iPad Air, 2 keyboards, and a Samsung Galaxy Tab 4.”  (PSI, pp.3 (parenthetical 
notations omitted), 7-8, 10.1)  After Thometz left the store, the customer service 
employee opened the boxes and discovered that they “did not contain any of the above 
items, but were filled with postal service boxes folded up to add weight.”  (PSI, p.3.)  
The “loss value” for the items was $1,020.41.  (PSI, p.3.)   
Six days later, Thometz again went to the same Wal-Mart and “returned” a 
“package that was supposed to be a Netgear Night Hawk Smart WiFi Router,” but was 
later found to contain only “an old laptop cooling fan.”  (PSI, p.3.)  The actual cost of the 
router was only $199.97; however, Thometz “had changed the price of the router” and 
the loss value for the item was $475.94.  (PSI, pp.3-4, 26-27.)     
The state charged Thometz with grand theft, petit theft, and two counts of 
burglary, with a persistent violator enhancement.  (R., pp.31-38.)  Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Thometz pled guilty to grand theft and the state dismissed the remaining 
charges and the enhancement, agreed to recommend a unified sentence of five years, 
with two years fixed, and also agreed to recommend the Drug Court program or, if 
Thometz was not accepted into Drug Court, to recommend a rider.  (R., pp.39-40, 42.)  
Thometz was not accepted into Drug Court, as his LSI-R score of 45 (indicating a “‘High 
Potential for Recidivism’”) was “to[o] high” and he did not qualify.  (R., pp.50-51; PSI, 
pp.21, 23.)  Consistent with the plea agreement, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.54-57.) 
 
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Thometz 
#44210 –confidential exhibits.pdf.”   
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The court also ordered that the sentence in this case run concurrently with Thometz’s 
sentences in the 2010 and 2013 cases (Minidoka County case number CR-2010-1326 
and Jerome County case number CR-2013-3632) for which Thometz was on probation 
when he committed the instant offense.  (R., p.55.)  Following the period of retained 
jurisdiction, on October 5, 2015, the district court suspended Thometz’s sentence and 
placed him on supervised probation for three years.  (R., pp.64-66.)    
Less than four months later, Thometz’s probation officer filed a report of violation 
alleging that Thometz had violated the conditions of his probation by failing to report to 
the probation office weekly as instructed at least seven different weeks between late 
November 2015 and early January 2016; being fired from his job on November 9, 2015 
and failing to maintain employment thereafter; associating with known felons and/or 
drug users; admitting, on December 7, 2015, that he had been using methamphetamine 
with Ashley Carter (a known drug user) and that he would test positive for 
methamphetamine that day as a result; failing to report for weekly drug testing as 
required “on October 30, November 13, 17, 25, December 4, 11, 16, 23, 29, 2015 and 
January 7, 2016”; admitting, on January 11, 2016, that he had failed to appear for his 
UA’s in part “because he had been using meth”; testing positive for methamphetamine 
“on January 14, 20, and 26, 2016”; testing positive for opiates on January 26, 2016 and 
admitting “to taking a pain medication that was not prescribed to him”; admitting that he 
had continued to associate “with Ashley Carter and other people involved in drugs” after 
testing positive for methamphetamine and after being specifically instructed not to 
associate with Ashley Carter; failing to attend Rider Aftercare weekly as required; and 
failing to attend 12-step meetings “at least twice a week” as required.  (Report of 
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Probation Violation (Augmentation).)  Thometz’s probation officer also reported that, in 
November 2015, Thometz admitted that “his mother purchased a car for him and he had 
been driving” without a license.  (Report of Probation Violation, p.4 (Augmentation).)  
Thometz admitted that he had violated the conditions of his probation by repeatedly 
associating with known felons and/or drug users with whom he had been instructed to 
have no contact, using methamphetamine on multiple occasions, failing to report for 
weekly drug testing on at least 10 separate occasions, testing positive for 
methamphetamine on several occasions, testing positive for opiates and taking pain 
medication for which he did not have a prescription, and failing to attend Rider Aftercare 
and 12-step meetings as required.  (R., pp.75-76; Tr., p.11, Ls.9-14; Report of Probation 
Violation, pp.2-3 (Augmentation).)  On March 28, 2016, the district court revoked 
Thometz’s probation, ordered the underlying sentence executed, and again retained 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp.78-80.)   
Eleven days later, Thometz filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of 
sentence, requesting that he be placed on probation due to the reoccurrence of the 
same health issue he had dealt with during his previous rider.  (R., pp.81-84.)  The 
district court entered an order denying the motion on April 13, 2016.  (R., pp.88-93.)  
Approximately 45 minutes later, on the same day (April 13, 2016 – 16 days after the 
entry of the order revoking probation), Thometz filed an “amended” Rule 35 motion for a 
reduction of sentence, requesting that the court relinquish jurisdiction and reduce his 
sentence because, on April 11, 2016, his sentence was executed in the 2013 Jerome 
County case.  (R., pp.94-97.)  Although the district court had already entered an order 
denying Thometz’s original, timely filed Rule 35 motion, the court noted that it would 
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“treat the instant motion as an amendment to the prior motion rather than a new, 
separate motion,” based on the court’s belief that the Thometz’s attorney had not yet 
received the court’s order denying the first Rule 35 motion at the time of filing the 
second, “amended” Rule 35 motion.  (R., p.102, n.1.)  On May 5, 2016 – 38 days after 
the entry of the order revoking probation – the district court entered an “Order Denying 
the Defendant’s Amended Motion to Reconsider Sentence and Request for Hearing,” 
wherein it denied Thometz’s amended Rule 35 motion as to the request for a reduction 
of sentence, but granted Thometz’s request that the court relinquish jurisdiction.  (R., 
pp.101-05.)  The court also entered a separate order relinquishing jurisdiction.  (R., 
pp.106-09.)  On May 19, 2016, Thometz filed a notice of appeal timely from both the 
district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion and from the district court’s order 
denying Thometz’s amended Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.110-13.)   
Thometz asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
amended Rule 35 motion because he was experiencing the same health issue while on 
his third rider that he had dealt with during his second rider, because he had already 
served 601 days of his sentence in the 2013 Jerome County case and, following the 
execution of his sentence in that case, he still had approximately 130 days of fixed time 
left to serve for that crime, “which should more than satisfy [the district court] on this 
matter,” and because he wished to “have already served his fixed time in this case” 
within that 130 days so that his parole eligibility dates would be the same in both cases.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.3-6; R., pp.81-83, 94-96.)  Thometz has failed to establish any 
basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying his amended Rule 35 motion.   
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Idaho Criminal Rule 35 vests the trial court with jurisdiction to consider and act 
upon a motion to reduce a sentence that is filed within 14 days after the entry of an 
order revoking probation unless that motion is to reduce an illegal sentence.  I.C.R. 35.  
The 14-day filing limit is a jurisdictional limit on the authority of the trial court to consider 
a timely motion for reduction of sentence.  State v. Sutton, 113 Idaho 832, 833, 748 
P.2d 416, 417 (Ct. App. 1987).  Pursuant to I.C.R 35, “no defendant may file more than 
one motion seeking a reduction of sentence under this Rule.”  In State v. Bottens, 137 
Idaho 730, 52 P.3d 875 (Ct. App. 2002), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that “the 
prohibition of successive motions under Rule 35 is a jurisdictional limit.”   
Thometz filed his first Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence on April 8, 2016. 
(R., pp.81-84.)  The district court entered an order denying the motion on April 13, 2016.  
(R., pp.88-93.)  Thometz filed his “amended” Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence 
shortly after the entry of the order denying the original Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.94-97.)  
Because Thometz’s “amended” Rule 35 motion was filed after the district court had 
ruled on Thometz’s first, original Rule 35 motion, his “amended” motion was a second, 
successive motion.  As such, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Thometz’s 
successive Rule 35 motion and the district court’s order denying the motion must be 
affirmed. 
Assuming the district court correctly treated the “Amended Motion to Reconsider 
Sentence under I.C.R. 35 and Request for Hearing” as an amended – rather than 
successive – motion (and therefore had jurisdiction to consider it), Thometz has 
nevertheless failed to establish that the court abused its discretion by declining to 
reduce his sentence.  In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 
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(2007), the Idaho Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not function as 
an appeal of a sentence.”  The Court noted that where a sentence is within statutory 
limits, a Rule 35 motion is merely a request for leniency, which is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion.  Id.  Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show 
that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently 
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  Id.  Absent the 
presentation of new evidence, “[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot 
be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence.”  Id.  Accord State v. Adair, 145 
Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 442 (2008).   
The only information Thometz provided in support of his amended Rule 35 
motion was that his sentence in the 2013 Jerome County case (“2013 case”) had been 
imposed.  (R., pp.94-97.)  This was not “new” information, as the district court was 
aware, throughout the proceedings in this case, of Thometz’s sentence in the 2013 case 
and of the history and status of that case.  (R., pp.52, 55, 64, 91; PSI, pp.8, 10; Report 
of Probation Violation, pp.3-4 (Augmentation); Tr., p.4, Ls.16-21.)  The PSI indicated 
that, in the 2013 case, Thometz received a unified sentence of 10 years, with three 
years fixed, and was placed in the retained jurisdiction program on November 25, 2013.  
(PSI, pp.8, 10.)  Thometz was placed on probation in the 2013 case on March 31, 2014; 
however, he violated his probation when he committed the instant offense and, on 
March 23, 2015, his probation was revoked in the 2013 case and he was placed in the 
retained jurisdiction program a second time.  (PSI, p.10.)  At the sentencing hearing in 
this case, held one week later on March 30, 2015, the court noted that it was “aware of 
sentencing in Jerome and that [Thometz] received a rider there,” and the court 
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subsequently imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, retained 
jurisdiction, and ordered that Thometz’s sentence in this case run concurrently with his 
sentence in the 2013 case.  (R., pp.52-55.)  Following Thometz’s (overall) second 
period of retained jurisdiction, on October 5, 2015, the district court placed Thometz on 
probation and ordered that Thometz’s “probation term in this case” run concurrently with 
the probation terms in Thometz’s 2010 and 2013 cases (Thometz was placed on 
probation on October 1, 2015 in the 2013 case).  (R., p.64; Report of Probation 
Violation, p.4 (Augmentation).)   
In the report of probation violation filed less than four months later, on January 
29, 2016, Thometz’s probation officer summarized the history of this case, the 2010 
case, and the 2013 case, noting that Thometz had “already been afforded the 
opportunity for treatment through CAPP twice, Probation and Parole, Mental Health 
Court, and in the community. However, he continues to choose not to use the tools 
gained in programming to comply with the rules of felony probation.”  (Report of 
Probation Violation, pp.3-4 (Augmentation).)  Thometz’s probation officer concluded that 
Thometz’s “behavior indicates he is unable or unwilling to abide by the terms of his 
probation.”  (Report of Probation Violation, p.4 (Augmentation).)  Indeed, the January 
2016 probation violation was, at minimum, Thometz’s fourth separate probation violation 
within less than three years, and his violations included repeated behaviors such as 
continued substance abuse, failing to attend treatment, associating with prohibited 
individuals, and committing new crimes.  (PSI, pp.7-10; Report of Probation Violation, 
pp.2-4 (Augmentation).)   
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At the March 28, 2016 probation violation admit/deny and disposition hearing in 
this case, Thometz’s counsel specifically advised the court that Thometz had a “very 
similar, if not identical” probation violation pending in the 2013 (Jerome County) case.  
(Tr., p.4, Ls.16-21.)  The district court subsequently asked Thometz, “In any way are 
you feeling like whatever happens here in Minidoka County will be contingent on what 
happens in Jerome County, or are you understanding these are two entirely different 
matters?” (Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.2); Thometz confirmed that he understood (Tr., p.11, 
L.3).  In addition, it was mentioned several times, throughout the disposition hearing, 
that Thometz had approximately two years of credit for time served in a separate, 
concurrent case (Tr., p.15, Ls.2-4; p.19, Ls.2-6; p.21, Ls.11-14; see also PSI, p.10; R., 
pp.73, 75, 91, 95; Report of Probation Violation, pp.3-4 (Augmentation) (indicating time 
served in the 2013 case)), whereas, in this case, his credit for time served was closer to 
one year (R., pp.65, 73, 75).  As such, the district court was aware, at the time that it 
revoked Thometz’s probation in this case, that Thometz had accrued a significant 
amount of credit for time served in his preceding cases.     
Contrary to Thometz’s claim that the time he served in the 2013 case “should 
more than satisfy the Court on this matter” (R., pp.95-96), the time he previously served 
in an unrelated, preexisting case is not “new” information, nor does it entitle him to a 
reduction of sentence in this case, particularly because a significant amount of 
Thometz’s credit for time served in the 2013 case was accumulated during the 
approximate year and one-half preceding his commission of the instant offense, and 
therefore is not at all attributable to his sentence in this case.  Furthermore, the district 
court was aware, at the time that it denied Thometz’s first Rule 35 motion, that 
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Thometz’s sentence in the 2013 case had been ordered executed, and the court 
nevertheless denied the request for reduction.  (R., p.91.)  That Thometz desired a 
sentence reduction in this case so that his parole eligibility date in this case would 
“coincide” (R., p.96) with the parole eligibility date in the 2013 case is likewise not “new” 
information, nor is it information that merits a reduction of sentence.   
Although Thometz did not discuss his health concerns in his “amended” Rule 35 
motion, this too is not new information that warranted a reduction of sentence.  (R., 
pp.94-97.)  On appeal, Thometz asserts that his sentence should have been reduced 
because his “prostatitis” – which he claims prevented him from “actively” participating in 
his second rider programming due to time spent “dealing with his medical issues” – 
“returned while on his third rider” and he “believed he would have the same medical 
issues and concerns on the third rider.”  (Appellant’ brief, pp.5-6 (citing R., p.82).)  
However, this claim is directly contradicted by a letter from Thometz, written following 
his second rider (for consideration at the rider review hearing), in which Thometz stated, 
“I was faced with some debilitating health issues during this process, yet worked 
through them and have been able to successfully take part in all of the programming 
offered, and have excelled in all areas.”  (PSI, p.67.)  As such, it is apparent that 
Thometz was, in fact, able to participate in programming while in IDOC custody, despite 
his prostatitis.  That his prostatitis returned almost immediately after the district court 
revoked his probation does not demonstrate that Thometz was entitled to a sentence 
reduction “so that when [he] is eligible for parole in the [2013] Jerome County case he 
will have already served his fixed time in this case.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.5 (citing R., 
p.96).)     
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Thometz failed to present any new information in support of his amended Rule 
35 motion.  Because Thometz presented no new evidence in support of his Rule 35 
motion, he failed to demonstrate in the motion that his sentence was excessive.  Having 
failed to make such a showing, he has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the 
district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.   
Even if this Court addresses the merits of Thometz’s claim, Thometz has still 
failed to establish an abuse of discretion.  At the disposition hearing in this case, the 
district court noted that it had already given Thometz “time and opportunity after 
opportunity after opportunity to stop what [he was] doing and meet up with my request 
to do a good clean recovery, and a good clean probation, and be done with it” (Tr., p.23, 
Ls.7-12), and that it had run his sentences concurrently “to give [Thometz] another 
break” (Tr., p.23, Ls.13-17).  Thometz has not shown that he was entitled to further 
leniency, particularly in light of his abysmal performance on probation, his repeated 
failures to complete programming in the community, his failure to rehabilitate despite the 
numerous treatment opportunities he has been afforded, and the high risk he presents 
to the community.  Given any reasonable view of the facts, Thometz has failed to 
establish that the district court abused its discretion by denying his amended Rule 35 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
denying Thometz’s amended Rule 35 motion. 
       




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming__________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of October, 2016, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic 
copy to: 
 
JENNY C. SWINFORD  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming__________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General     
 
